Shareholder Activism in Japan, the EU, the UK and the US: A Comparative Study

Eine gemeinsame Veranstaltung der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, der juristischen Fakultät des University College London, des Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht sowie der Deutsch-Japanischen Juristenvereinigung e.V.

About the symposium:

The system of corporate governance has gone through significant changes in major jurisdictions in the past decade. On the European continent and in Japan, the system of mutual shareholdings is now more or less gone. On the other hand, investment funds have become more active in participating in the management of listed companies, for example, demanding higher dividends, share buy-back, and even disposal of part of the business. To some extent, this has a positive effect on corporate governance by increasing corporate value in terms of higher share prices. At the same time, it may bring in ‘short-termism’ to corporate governance, affecting the long-term strategy of the companies.

Since the late 2010s, the operation of activist funds have become conspicuous in Japan. Japan is reputed to be a fertile ground for activist funds for various statutory reasons. Arguably also because the stock of many Japanese companies is considered undervalued. There have been cases where disputes between the activist funds, the target company, and the existing shareholders reached the court. The goal of the present symposium is to look at the situation regarding activist funds in Japan in a comparative perspective. After addressing the current situation in Japan, the US system, where shareholder activism originated, is to be addressed. Although the Japanese legislature sought to assimilate the American corporate governance system in the early 2000s, now the UK system and the European continental (German and French) systems are attracting more interest in Japan. How these jurisdictions cope with shareholder activism and activist funds in comparison to Japan is the basic issue to be discussed at this symposium. Shareholder activism has its pros and cons. The goal of the symposium is to seek an optimal balance by looking at the experience in different jurisdictions.

Das Symposium findet im Raum “Commerzbank” im “House of Finance“, Goethe-Universität, Westend Campus, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3, Frankfurt statt.

Detaillierte Informationen zum Programm und den Vortragenden entnehmen Sie bitte der Einladung auf dieser Seite.

Die Vorträge und Diskussionen werden in englischer Sprache gehalten.

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