Shareholder Activism in Japan and Beyond

In theory, shareholder activism has a positive effect on corporate governance by increasing corporate value as reflected in higher share prices. But at the same time, it may lead to “short-termism”, affecting the long-term strategy of companies. A new special issue of the Zeitschrift für Japanisches Recht/Journal of Japanese Law (ZJapanR/J.Japan.L.) examines shareholder activism from a comparative perspective.

The system of corporate governance has undergone significant changes across major jurisdictions over the past decade. On the European continent and in Japan, the system of stable shareholdings is now largely gone. As in the US, investment funds have become more active in the management of listed companies. Shareholder activism is thus a relevant factor throughout major economies today. Especially in Japan, the operation of activist funds has become conspicuous since the late 2010s. Multiple disputes between activist funds, target companies, and existing shareholders have reached Japanese courts.

The assembled contributions are expanded, edited versions of the lectures given at the comparative conference “Shareholder Activism in Japan, the EU, the UK and the US,” held at Goethe-University Frankfurt in March 2025. They examine the current situation from a comparative perspective, highlighting that across jurisdictions, the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of activist investors shows striking similarities. The broad comparison undertaken reveals that activist investment takes place in a dynamic environment, one that is highly dependent on the specific legal, political, and cultural framework, thus offering rich opportunities for future research.

The publication has also been made available open access.

Image: © Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law